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Abstract: Blockchain technology has been considered a vehicle to foster development in poor 
countries by promoting applications such as secure delivery of humanitarian aid, digital identity 
services, and proof of provenance. This article examines whether (and if so how) blockchain 
technology can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign aid governance, thereby moving 
beyond completely anonymous contexts. Foreign aid governance is plagued by lack of credible 
commitments among states which are further exacerbated by information asymmetries and which 
often undermine aid effectiveness. In this context, blockchain technology holds two promises. First, 
through guaranteed execution of smart contracts, it can strengthen the credibility of state 
commitments, for example collective burden-sharing rules among a group of donors or recipient-
country compliance with policy conditionality in return for aid. Second, through leveraging 
prediction markets, blockchain technology can allay information problems related to the 
verification of real-world events along the entire aid delivery chain.  
 
1. Introduction  
Foreign aid—the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by donor governments—
is considered indispensible for eradicating poverty, reducing inequality, and promoting 
sustainable development. However, foreign aid is plagued by a plethora of collective action 
problems. For instance, despite high-level donor pledges to design aid interventions 
sustainably, organizational incentives within donor agencies, strategic interests, and limited 
transparency often give rise to inefficient spending, with negative repercussions on aid 
effectiveness (Monkam, 2012). In bilateral aid relationships, recipient governments often do 
not follow through with promised reforms while donor countries disburse aid nonetheless due 
to conflicting motives (Swedlund, 2017). In multilateral aid, individual donors may renege on 
their promise to share a collective financing burden for joint development programs 
(Mascarenhas and Sandler, 2006). In all the above cases, actors are unable to make credible 
commitments because effective institutions that would allow them to do so are missing. In 
addition, actors have limited information as to whether aid interventions really work, which 
prevents a more effective allocation of aid resources.  
In this article, I explore the potential of blockchain technology to enhance the effectiveness of 
foreign aid governance.  Blockchain technology—a cryptographically linked digital ledger of 
transactions distributed across all participants of a peer-to-peer network—has enabled 
‘trustless’ interactions among individuals without the need for a central authority. The 
blockchain basically is a giant spreadsheet that sequentially records transactions among users 
and distributes this ledger across the entire network, which ensures that all actors have secure 
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access to an immutable transaction record. The sanctity of the data is achieved by 
decentralized consensus—a mechanism whereby network participants agree on a shared set of 
data and continually record valid changes to that data (Buterin, 2014; Valkenburgh, 2016; 
Baliga, 2017). 
Blockchain technology may affect aid governance in two distinct ways. On the one hand, it 
may be used to enhance aid effectiveness within the current system of aid intermediaries, 
which includes governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). This is a likely scenario because blockchain technology offers tangible benefits to 
these actors without challenging their role as central authorities. On the other hand, 
blockchain technology may enable peer-to-peer systems of charitable giving that circumvent 
governments as aid providers altogether. The disintermediation of aid governance is a less-
likely scenario, because not only aid intermediaries will resist it but also they are often needed 
to fulfill vital tasks that the blockchain cannot deliver, such as validation of real-world events, 
policy deliberation, and the provision of technical assistance.   
Taking a positivist view, the paper focuses on the first scenario. Its point of departure is that  
existing institutions—the systems of social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 
2006)—are only partly effective. An important example of an institution in foreign aid is the 
practice of ‘conditionality’, whereby donors provide funding for development only when 
recipients satisfy certain conditions. However, conditionality is often not credible because the 
donors are also driven by considerations other than development need, while recipient 
countries may renege on reform commitments in the face of opposition from powerful 
domestic constituencies (Swedlund, 2017). To some extent, multilateral organizations such as 
the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund provide these 
actors with a credible commitment device and thereby uphold the rules governing complex 
aid relationships (Dreher and Voigt, 2011). Multilateral organizations are the most centralized 
institutions in world politics that have the authority to collect information, verify compliance, 
and authorize sanctions to enforce state commitments. While centralization helps allay some 
collective action dilemmas in aid governance, it often generates additional costs related to 
excessive bureaucracy and ‘agency slack’ (Martens et al., 2003; Nielson and Tierney, 2003; 
Vaubel, 2006). 
Blockchain technology can enhance the effectiveness of the currently existing aid governance 
institutions in at least three ways. First, blockchain technology allows states to make more 
credible commitments. To that end, countries would need to encode all aid contracts as ‘smart 
contracts’ on a blockchain to import guaranteed execution when predefined conditions are 
fulfilled. Smart contracts are effective only when states have staked actual resources upon the 
commitments that these contracts entail. Their efficiency gains are greatest for complete 
contracts that leave no ambiguity about how their terms should be interpreted. The potential 
pitfalls of smart contracts are that they are more rigid than semantic contracts and that 
guaranteed enforcement is limited to the blockchain itself while central authorities are still 
necessary to enforce transactions involving exchanges of actual property (Sklaroff, 2017). 
Second, blockchain technology can be used to leverage hitherto untapped sources of 
information to verify compliance and to make better-informed policy decisions. In particular, 
blockchain-based prediction markets provide reliable information about real-world events 
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which underpin aid relations governed by smart contracts. This application of blockchain 
technology is particularly useful where individuals (such as aid beneficiaries) are able to make 
accurate reports on events and where central authorities do not have the capacity, willingness, 
or incentives to report accurately.   
By showing how blockchain technology may affect aid governance, my article contributes to 
several debates in the social-scientific literature. First, it casts light on the economic ontology 
of blockchain, providing evidence of its institution-like properties (Davidson, De Filippi and 
Potts, 2018). Specifically, the benefit of blockchain is to make established institutions—such 
as markets, firms, the state, and relational contracts (Hodgson, 2015)—more effective and 
efficient, or even to offer an alternative organizational mechanism to reach agreement about 
economic facts (Davidson, De Filippi and Potts, 2018, p. 11). The ontology of blockchain 
ultimately depends on the purposes for which stakeholders will use it because technological 
objects have a dual nature—a physical structure (how its constituent parts fit together) and a 
social purpose (the technical identity and the function assigned to it by a community that uses 
it) (Faulkner and Runde, 2013). In the most-likely scenario, blockchains remain a technology 
that enhance the effectiveness of existing institutions, as donor organizations will use 
blockchains for efficiency improvements in the aid delivery chain, for example by securely 
sharing information across organizations, automatically settling transactions, and 
circumventing financial sector intermediaries. In a utopian scenario, blockchains become 
social institutions themselves, as they take over core functions of existing organizations 
(including donor aid agencies) such as coordinating aid programs based on beneficiary 
demand, verifying state behavior, and enforcing complex aid contracts. 
Second, I also cast light on the relationship between blockchain technology and existing 
institutions (Hendrickson, Hogan and Luther, 2016; Hendrickson and Luther, 2017; Davidson, 
De Filippi and Potts, 2018). How does blockchain technology interact with traditional 
institutions? Does it coexist with these institutions, or does it challenge their primacy? My 
analysis suggests that on balance it is complementary rather than substitutive. It is substitutive 
for complete contracts, which are more efficiently handled by smart contracts, while also 
holding promise to reduce the cost of verification (Wright and De Filippi, 2015). Conversely, 
blockchain technology is complementary to currently existing multilateral organizations, 
which are better placed to handle contingencies that arise under incomplete contracting 
(Maskin and Tirole, 1999). The discussion about how blockchain technology affects the 
existing actors in the aid system is absent from policy-oriented studies. Reflecting growing 
interest from official donors, studies have analyzed use cases in aid delivery, such as 
conditional cash transfers, digital identity, remittances, supply chain management, communal 
energy exchanges, and property rights (DANIDA, 2017; GSMA, 2017; IDRC, 2017; Wigley 
and Cary, 2017; KfW, 2018). Blockchain technology in these areas is useful as it remedies the 
relative lack of institutions under conditions of asymmetric information (Ostrom et al., 2002, 
p. 7). However, discussions about how blockchain technology may disrupt aid governance are 
not covered in these studies. In fact, blockchains could potentially diminish the existing aid 
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intermediaries because they allow secure transactions between charitable givers and ultimate 
beneficiaries without the need for a trusted intermediary.1 
Third, I contribute to a voluminous literature on the determinants of aid effectiveness and the 
effectiveness of international organizations more generally. Scholars have examined the 
various ways in which foreign aid can be made more effective, emphasizing aid allocation 
modalities in this regard. However, all aid modalities—such as project aid, program aid, and 
budget support—have tradeoffs in that they address some agency problem but inadvertently 
create others (Easterly, 2005; Martens, 2005; Knack and Rahman, 2007; Bigsten and 
Tengstam, 2015; Molenaers, Dellepiane and Faust, 2015). While circumventing recipient 
governments is considered to be another alternative (Dietrich, 2013), it tends to shift the locus 
of agency problems to the non-governmental sector. Blockchain technology has the potential 
to enhance the effectiveness of all preexisting aid governance mechanisms. Others have 
examined how multilaterals can become more effective (Gutner and Thompson, 2010; 
Tallberg et al., 2016; Lall, 2017), emphasizing the need for agent autonomy (Gulrajani, 2017; 
Lall, 2017; Honig, 2019). While centralization fosters autonomy (Abbott and Snidal, 1998), it 
may also create undesirable outcomes and organizational dysfunction (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 1999). Blockchain-based aid governance—as a decentralized solution—may 
avoid the pitfalls of centralization while removing possibilities for manipulation.  
In the remainder of this article, I proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces blockchain 
technology through the lens of New Institutional Economics and discusses conditions under 
which it is most beneficial compared to existing solutions. Section 3 discusses common 
challenges to effective foreign aid delivery and how existing institutions are meant to address 
these challenges. Section 4 probes the potential for blockchain technology to improve foreign 
aid governance, reviewing existing applications and outlining potential applications. Section 5 
discusses the findings and concludes. The supplemental appendix introduces the mechanics of 
blockchain technology and presents use cases for development unrelated to governance 
issues. 
 
2.  Blockchain technology and New Institutional Economics 
One of the central insights of New Institutional Economics (NIE)—departing from 
neoclassical economics—is that transactions are not costless; hence, the form in which they 
occur matters socioeconomic outcomes (Williamson, 1979; Harris, Hunter and Lewis, 1995; 
Khan, 1995). Transaction costs can be defined as the costs of agreeing a contract—including 
measuring all the attributes relevant for the exchange—and the cost of enforcing a contract—
including the costs of detecting infringement, policing, and punishing (North, 1990, p. 27). In 
the NIE view, under-development persists because societies lack the institutions that would 
enable them to pursue mutually beneficial transactions. But where institutions to reduce 
                                                          
1 As I show later, central authorities will not be completely redundant because they are crucial for 
administering the blockchain-based aid system as a permissioned blockchain and for validating actor 
behavior unless other oracles are available for that purpose. 
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information asymmetry and to mitigate commitment problems evolved—the Maghribi trade 
coalition provides a historical example (Greif, 1993)—societies thrive.  
The optimal form of an institution depends on the level of uncertainty, the frequency of 
interactions, and the degree to which actors make durable asset-specific investments 
(Williamson, 1979, p. 247). The market is the most efficient institution for recurrent 
exchanges of fairly homogenous products. In contrast, for frequent transactions of specific 
assets, a transaction-specific governance structure is preferable. One such governance 
structure is the firm (Coase, 1937). In the realm of political exchanges, international 
organizations can be understood as centralized authorities that exist to remove transactions 
from the political market to integrate them under a hierarchical structure. Another governance 
modality refers to bilateral structures that preserve the autonomy of the contracting parties. 
Most intergovernmental exchanges do not involve international organizations but are 
governed by bilateral contracts. In reality, none of these contracts is complete, as they cannot 
specify all contingencies.  
From a NIE perspective, blockchain technology is theoretically attractive because it can 
reduce transaction costs. In particular, blockchain technology allows actors to securely share 
resources—money, information, or other assets—in a fully transparent manner but without the 
need for a centralized clearinghouse. It thus offers a new method for managing relationships 
under incomplete trust (Nelson, 2018, p. 4). In essence, the blockchain is a giant spreadsheet 
that sequentially records transactions among users and distributes this ledger across the entire 
network (IDRC, 2017). Adding new data requires consensus among participants to ensure that 
only one canonical blockchain exists at any given moment.  
Blockchain technology also facilitates so-called ‘smart contracts’—pieces of code that run on 
top of a blockchain (Szabo, 1994; Swan, 2015; Diedrich, 2016). Smart contracts can bind 
parties more effectively than conventional contracts because they cannot be stopped (since 
they run on top of a blockchain, all participants run them simultaneously). Smart contracts can 
reduce uncertainty in relational contracting under two conditions. First, parties must have 
staked resources upon their commitments. The prospect of losing the stake if a party does not 
follow through on its promise provides an incentive for compliant behavior. Second, 
evaluating whether a party complies with the terms of an agreement must be verifiable. While 
blockchain technology “itself does nothing to improve the reliability of inputs” (Pisa, 2018, p. 
2), it can be used to create incentive systems for truthful reporting of non-digital real-world 
events. In particular, blockchain-based prediction markets provide a mechanism to bring 
trusted data onto the blockchain, even though for some applications, third-party judgment will 
still be necessary for verification.  
Blockchain technology, notably smart contracts, promise to reduce transactions costs by 
allowing for automated execution. Arguably, these efficiency gains are highest where parties 
interact frequently and with homogenous assets, such as digital currency (Wright and De 
Filippi, 2015). Blockchain technology entails little efficiency gain for incomplete contracts, 
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which require a governance mechanism as contract completion device.2 While almost all 
contracts are incomplete (Hart and Moore, 1999), they are incomplete in many ways—and 
blockchain technology can address specific kinds of contract incompleteness. As discussed 
above, it can reduce uncertainty around contract enforcement, while also reducing information 
asymmetry by providing an impeachable record of transactions.  
To be sure, blockchain technology is no panacea. While it can enhance the functioning of 
existing institutions (and sometimes can replace them), it also generates additional costs 
related to the complexity that decentralized solutions necessarily introduce. The need to foster 
consensus before adding new data on the blockchain makes these systems slow. Furthermore, 
there also is a need for several layers of encryption to control ‘who can see what’, which is 
important for reasons of data privacy. A final challenge is regulatory uncertainty around 
permissionless blockchains (Pisa, 2018, p. 2). The disadvantages of blockchain technology 
can be mitigated by appropriate design. Complexity costs are highest for so-called 
permissionless blockchains, where anyone can write consensus data; the need for proof of 
work, which is required to ensure the sanctity of the data, implies a waste of energy (Truby, 
2018).3 In contrast, permissioned blockchains are not subject to the same problems, as they 
restrict write-access to pre-authenticated users and thus reduce computational complexity 
(Baliga, 2017). Users also need not store all data on the blockchain, but referring to them on 
the blockchain through a cryptographic hash—a small bit-string that cryptographically 
represents data of arbitrary size—creates an immutable record. With minimal data actually 
stored on the blockchain, storage requirements and associated costs remain manageable. 
In sum, blockchain technology will likely break through specifically where the currently-
existing systems for trusted exchanges are slow, inefficient, or expensive and where demand 
for transparency is high. It is particularly beneficial where transaction frequency is high and 
where assets are digitally representable. 
 
3.  Principal-agent problems in foreign aid  
Foreign aid is transaction-heavy as it involves a myriad of actors who must contribute specific 
resources to achieve sustainable development outcomes. Foreign aid is plagued by numerous 
principal-agent problems along its chain of delivery (Martens, 2005; Svensson, 2006; Vaubel, 
2006). In this framework, a ‘principal’ delegates implementation responsibility to an ‘agent’, 
                                                          
2 There are good reasons against complete contracts, in which case the consensus mechanism provides a 
contract completion device. Newer types of cryptocurrencies have recognized the inherent disadvantages of 
immutable transaction records (Abramowicz, 2016). For instance, Tezos provides for a self-amending 
cryptoledger governed by participant consensus, https://www.tezos.com/static/papers/position_paper.pdf 
(accessed October 22, 2017). 
3 For example, the authoritative blockchain in the Bitcoin economy is the longest one, which has the 
highest proof of work (i.e., a computationally costly solution of a cryptographic problem). An attacker—
trying to send previously spent bitcoins to herself—would need to convince a majority of nodes that her 
blockchain history was true, which would be possible if she controlled a majority of the computational 
power required for proof of work. The real cost of such an attack is about USD 1 billion (Abramowicz, 
2016, p. 379).  
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who may possess specific expertise and local knowledge that hold promise to make aid more 
effective (Nielson and Tierney, 2003). However, information asymmetry and divergent 
interests create agency slack whereby the agent exploits its discretion for private gain. The 
principal seeks to address this problem by taking precautionary arrangements, such as ex-ante 
contract design and ex-post controls (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Moe, 1984; Martens, 
2005)—but these arrangements are costly to the principal and thus undermine the gains from 
delegation. In the following, I identify the most important principal-agent relationships along 
the aid delivery chain and describe how current institutions seek to address these problems.  
Donor-country citizens may wish to support development abroad through private charitable 
giving (Andreoni, 1990; Nunnenkamp, Öhler and Schwörer, 2013; Mastromatteo and Russo, 
2017). Private charitable giving involves an information problem: A potential donor may not 
know about a potential recipient who has specific needs that the donor wishes to address. An 
even bigger problem is that beneficiaries cannot prove that they are really in need.  
Non-governmental organizations exist as a solution to these dilemmas. NGOs often develop 
expertise in a single development issue and have in-country presence, which allow them to 
identify potential beneficiaries and verify actual need. By pooling contributions from 
individual donors with similar preferences, NGOs can afford the fixed costs of screening 
potential beneficiaries and monitoring beneficiaries during project implementation. While 
NGOs have incentives for truthful reporting to uphold their reputation with donors, they also 
operate in a competitive environment that incentivizes them to under-emphasize project 
failures, mobilize funding only for highly publicized challenges, and divert resources to 
fundraising rather than project implementation (Cooley and Ron, 2002).  
Donor governments—acting through bilateral donor agencies—centralize aid finance within 
a donor nation by levying taxes from citizens and distributing the funds to recipient countries. 
They essentially exist as a solution to a collective action problem among donor-country 
citizens with heterogeneous aid preferences (Martens, 2005). But donor governments may 
divert aid from its intended purpose, for instance to bribe recipient governments in exchange 
for political favors (de Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Donor governments thus cannot credibly 
commit to disburse aid as the taxpayers would want them to. To tie their hands, governments 
must surrender control over how aid is disbursed, for instance by delegating it to multilateral 
organizations (Milner, 2006). Nonetheless, donor countries sometimes intervene into 
multilateral aid allocation, notably when their salient geopolitical interests are at stake. For 
example, at the behest of powerful donor countries, the World Bank increases its aid 
disbursements to recipient countries when they serve as temporary members at the UN 
Security Council (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009). 
In theory, multilateral organizations promise to address collective action problems among 
several donor governments. The joint funding of development programs may be plagued by 
cheating—as individual contributions are near-perfect substitutes for each other (Olson and 
Zeckhauser, 1966; Mascarenhas and Sandler, 2006; Sandler, 2007). Donor governments may 
be unable to uphold their commitment to fully disburse promised funds, for instance when 
political ideology changes. Multilateral organizations allow governments to keep their 
promises and to lock in policy, notably by establishing burden-sharing mechanisms. In 
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practice, however, multilateral agencies can do little to enforce funding pledges of recalcitrant 
donors, as the historical UN experience for example of the United States withholding funds 
illustrates (Graham, 2017). 
Even when donors have already contributed their shares of the funding burden, they face a 
coordination dilemma of where to engage and in which ways. Ill-coordinated aid imposes 
additional costs on stretched state administrations of recipient countries which have to deal 
with several hundreds of donor missions every year (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore, 
2006; Knack and Rahman, 2007). Informal institutions such as ‘lead donorship’ have done 
little to remedy this problem (Steinwand, 2015). Hence, donors might use multilateral 
organizations to allay such coordination problems (Annen and Knack, 2015). For instance, the 
European Union has a role in coordinating bilateral aid activities to avoid phenomena such as 
‘aid darlings’ and ‘aid orphans’ (Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015). In practice, however, aid 
coordination remains limited, as multilateral organizations cannot compel bilateral donors to 
abandon isolated activities and instead channel funds multilaterally.  
Most types of foreign aid are handed out to recipient governments, which are the custodians 
of funds for ultimate beneficiaries. Recipient governments are interested in effective aid 
delivery—especially if they are directly accountable to local beneficiaries—but they also face 
incentives to re-purpose aid for their own advantage. Hence, rather than providing public 
goods, recipient governments may siphon off aid flows for private consumption, to buy 
military equipment, or to support their ethnic kin. In short, recipient governments face 
commitment problems to use aid only for development purposes. Historical examples of 
foreign aid propping up brutal dictators abound (Coyne and Ryan, 2009; Bader and Faust, 
2014; Molenaers, Dellepiane and Faust, 2015). 
Donor agencies with pro-development interests have developed several ways to avoid such 
misuse of aid. On the one hand, donors may ‘bypass’ recipient governments altogether. When 
recipient governments are corrupt, donors bypass them and channel aid through NGOs as a 
more trustworthy intermediary (Dietrich, 2013). While this strategy has short-term 
advantages, it deprives donors of the possibility to build more capable states through direct 
engagement. Furthermore, bypassing simply shifts the agency problem to NGOs, whose 
preferences may not be fully aligned with those of the donor. On the other hand, donors have 
developed a host of aid delivery modalities to address agency problems—but all aid 
modalities also create new problems. For instance, in project aid—the most commonly used 
modality—donors plan specific interventions and tightly control their implementation. This 
eliminates aid capture by minimizing agent discretion but foregoes recipient-country 
ownership and inflates administrative costs within the donor agency. As an alternative to 
project aid, results-based aid disburses upon delivery of pre-defined outputs, but raises issues 
about verifying results and dealing with adverse shocks beyond the control of the recipient. 
While these aid modalities invariably mitigate incentive problems, they require donors to 
resolve tradeoffs between ex-ante transaction costs and ex-post uncertainty (Martens, 2005). 
Ex-ante costs are highest for project aid, which involves screening recipients, identifying 
contractors, and preparing project documents. Ex-post uncertainty is highest for unconditional 
aid transfers, which give recipients considerable flexibility as regards the use of funds. In such 
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circumstances, donors need to maintain capacities for monitoring recipient behavior and 
sanctioning violations (Svensson, 2006).  
A widespread donor practice to address agency problems is ‘conditionality’, whereby donors 
promise to disburse funds when the recipient satisfies certain conditions. While ex-ante 
conditionality screens out recipients that do not meet certain conditions, ex-post conditionality 
punishes recipients for non-compliance after they received the funds. In practice, donors 
combine both approaches by disbursing aid in tranches upon implementation of agreed 
reforms (Mussa and Savastano, 2000). Conditionality is not without its own problems. First, 
donor agencies and recipient governments may not agree on whether certain actions reflect a 
breach of contractual conditions. Monitoring recipient behavior and verifying breaches with 
agreed conditions also is not easy, and even where monitoring is possible, it is costly and 
reduces resources available for alleviating development needs. Second, conditionality is often 
not credible because donor governments have additional motivations besides alleviating 
development needs. Anticipating ‘Good Samaritan’ donor behavior, the recipient will receive 
the aid and violate conditions because it need not fear aid suspensions (Svensson, 2006). 
Multilateral organizations are better able to enforce conditionality (Rodrik, 1995) as they 
dilute the influence of any individual donor. But since these organizations also must cater to 
the interests of their most powerful shareholders, they remain imperfect solutions to the 
problem of credibly enforcing conditionality (Stone and Steinwand, 2008). 
As the above discussion illustrates, multilateral organizations currently are the best-available 
solution to asymmetric information, transaction costs, and incentive problems in aid 
governance. They allow countries to obtain more information, make more credible 
commitments, and coordinate aid policy (Rodrik, 1995; Dreher and Voigt, 2011; Annen and 
Knack, 2015). As actors in their own right, they are also more development-oriented than 
their bilateral counterparts (Headey, 2008; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010; Knack, Rogers and 
Eubank, 2011). Aid ratings such as the QuODA illustrate this finding (Figure 1). All selected 
bilateral donors fare worse than the International Development Association (IDA) in terms of 
maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing burdens, and transparency.  
Figure 1: QuODA ranking of selected donor agencies. 
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Notes: Diamonds with larger area represent better donor behavior toward recipient countries. Data for 
selected donors sourced from https://www.cgdev.org/page/quality-oda-quoda (accessed July 25, 2018). 
However, multilateral organizations are not without challenges either. They create 
administrative costs related to bureaucracy. More than 230 multilaterals exist (Kharas, 2007), 
with overheads of around 35% not being unusual. To make matters worse, multilaterals also 
generate agency costs for donors, beyond the inevitable loss of control resulting from 
multilateral delegation. Thanks to their local presence in almost all countries, they have 
informational advantages that they may exploit to benefit their own agendas, for example by 
focusing on interventions that undermine the human rights of the poor (Easterly, 2014). Such 
multilateral agency drift is particularly pronounced when donor countries have diverging aid 
preferences (Nielson and Tierney, 2003). Donor countries may contain agency drift by ex-
ante measures and ex-post controls, which increase the cost of delegation. Ex-ante measures 
pertain to the design of agency contract(s), for instance the provision of earmarked funding 
with much narrower delegated mandates than unearmarked funding (Reinsberg, 2017). Ex-
post measures emphasize control of agent behavior, including measures such as shadow 
bureaucracies (Dijkstra, 2014), review of reports in the formal governing bodies (Nielson and 
Tierney, 2003), and relying on signals from watchdog organizations such as NGOs (Weaver, 
2007).  
The subsequent section probes to what extent blockchain technology can improve aid 
governance under the currently existing aid system (with a range of agencies intermediating 
aid-giving from individual donors to ultimate beneficiaries). In the existing use cases, 
blockchain technology enhances the functioning of existing institutions by reducing 
information asymmetries and mitigating commitment problems. In a potential set of cases, it 
may even replace existing organizations to the extent that it performs similar functions at 
lower cost.  
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4.  Can blockchain technology improve aid governance?  
Asymmetric information  
Blockchain technology can prevent fraud in charitable giving. The currently existing aid 
governance architecture—with its numerous aid intermediaries—exists to create a ‘feedback 
loop’ between individual donors and ultimate beneficiaries (Svensson, 2006). But this system 
of intermediaries is inefficient: Each intermediary operates its own database with the personal 
records of beneficiaries. Under a blockchain-based aid system, individual beneficiaries would 
have a unique digital identity, securely stored on a blockchain and verifiable for every service 
provider that requires proof of identity in the delivery of aid. The blockchain makes the data 
tamper-proof and trusted by all participants and reduces the need for intermediaries for 
charitable giving once beneficiaries have been validated as legitimate recipients of aid.  
Blockchain technology for cross-border charitable payments is already operational. For 
example, AID:Tech developed a blockchain-based platform for ensuring “the integrity of 
charitable contributions and social welfare programs” (Wellisz, 2018). In partnership with the 
Irish Red Cross, the company delivered aid to 500 Syrian refugees in Lebanon using 
blockchain technology. The refugees obtained a unique identifier recorded on the blockchain 
which they could use to buy products in local partnering stores. The system is said to work 
even when refugees are not connected to the internet as their voucher cards have a QR code 
stamped on it (Aid:Tech, 2018, p. 6).  
According to its whitepaper, the Aid:Tech platform “enables entitlements such as welfare, 
remittances, donations, aid, and healthcare to be digitized and transparently delivered to end-
users using blockchain technology in a completely transparent manner” (Aid:Tech, 2018, p. 
6). Aid fraud is likely minimized because assets can be traced instantly and beneficiaries have 
their unique digital identifiers stored on the blockchain. While beneficiaries self-identify on 
the platform as potential aid recipients, an intermediary (such as Irish Red Cross) is still 
necessary to verify that they are needy. Once beneficiaries are recorded on the blockchain, all 
transactions are traceable and they can receive assets without need for verification.  
In many developing countries, mobile phone providers are uniquely positioned to act as 
validators, as customers pre-registered with them and settle most of their transactions through 
mobile money. BanQu is an example of a platform providing blockchain-based digital identity 
based on network credentials from mobile phone companies as validators (GSMA, 2017, p. 
17). The benefit of this blockchain-based solution is that aid intermediaries may no longer be 
necessary to verify individual need—depending on how reliably such need can be assessed 
through the network credentials alone. While aid intermediaries may become less important, 
some other type of intermediary—such as a mobile phone provider—must provide proof of 
identity.  
Foreign aid goes beyond financial payments to ultimate beneficiaries, as it commonly 
involves contractual relationships in which a donor agency pays a service provider for 
delivery of certain outputs. Under the current system, such procurement processes may be 
plagued by bribery and bid rigging (Wellisz, 2018). Contractor relationships should thus be 
encoded as smart contracts that automate the entire process and make fraud less likely. Even 
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though possibilities for fraud remain when assets are not digitally traceable, the transparency 
of a blockchain-powered procurement platform4 enables big data analysis on procurement 
data to detect likely fraud. Furthermore, the ‘Internet of Things’ facilitates low-cost 
verification of transactions. For instance, a smart contract might release funds to a contractor 
only if a tamper-proof smart meter indicates that a certain amount of energy has actually been 
consumed.  
Transaction costs   
Blockchain technology also promises to reduce the literal transaction costs of aid delivery. In 
the current system, transaction costs are unavoidable given the need for intermediaries. Aid 
intermediaries—NGOs, bilateral aid agencies, and multilateral organizations—produce 
administrative costs to the ultimate donor, while non-aid intermediaries such as commercial 
banks charge transaction fees for every donation. Blockchain technology can help reduce such 
costs because it relies less on intermediaries (if not making them redundant).  
Real-existing solutions have delivered transaction cost savings by minimizing the 
involvement of non-aid intermediaries. For instance, the World Food Program (WFP) uses 
blockchains to make assistance disbursements to Syrian refugees in Jordan faster, cheaper, 
better traceable, and more secure. To that end, it has developed Building Blocks, a blockchain-
based platform giving each refugee a unique digital identifier and linking it to the biometric 
data from UNHCR. A recipient with an entitlement from WFP can self-identify through an 
iris scan at the point of sale of participating retailers and the transaction will be recorded on 
the blockchain. Since this transaction record can be trusted, WFP can use the information to 
pay the retailer directly. The auditability of the blockchain ensures that all aid funds are 
accounted for and traceable in real time. Compared to the current solution involving money 
transfers to bank accounts for each refugee, WFP saves transaction fees (which are around 
3.5% of the average aid transaction) and capital cost as it drastically reduced its advances to 
the bank (GSMA, 2017, p. 25).  
Disberse is a fund management platform for aid finance that is available to a wider set of 
donors.5 Powered by the Ethereum blockchain, Disberse acts as an electronic money provider 
to guarantee, issue, and distribute the funds more transparently and at lower costs than via 
traditional non-aid intermediaries. The platform receives donor funds in fiat currency and 
holds them in escrow. It then tokenizes the funds and disburses them as e-money to all 
stakeholders involved in a given project through their blockchain wallet. The transaction is 
ultimately settled with a financial partner. Disberse implemented its first pilot in 2017, 
involving funding by a UK NGO to a Swazi NGO and onto four local schools. In addition to 
                                                          
4 One example of a blockchain-based procurement platform is Teneris (Wellisz, 2018). The benefits of such 
a platform would include resilience against fraud (as the identity of bidders is verifiable and all transactions 
are visible to everyone) and efficiency gains in settling transactions (as smart contracts would automate 
payment on delivery and match buyers and sellers).  
5 KfW—the German Development Bank—also set up a pilot for secure tracking of funds via a 
permissioned blockchain (KfW, 2018).  
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tracking the funds from end to end in real time, the donor saved 2.5% on their transfer fees 
(GSMA, 2017, pp. 20–21).6  
To harness real transaction cost savings using blockchain technology, the above cases use 
permissioned blockchains, which involve lower computational costs and smaller latency 
compared to permissionless ones.7 The price to pay for these benefits, however, is that donors 
must trust the people who designed the blockchain, the platform owners, and those 
organizations which verify the data recorded on the blockchain.  
Commitment problems  
Some obstacles to effective aid delivery are more fundamental than corrupt contractors and 
transaction fees. These obstacles relate to a lack of credible commitment by governments. 
While donor governments cannot commit to disburse funds that they had promised, recipient 
governments cannot commit to implement reforms once they receive aid funds (Swedlund, 
2017). Under the current aid governance architecture, a host of aid modalities is meant to 
address these problems, specifically on the recipient side. But these remedies remain 
necessarily imperfect.  
Albeit not a currently existing use case, blockchain-chain based aid governance could allow 
states to make more credible commitments, thereby enhancing aid effectiveness. To that end, 
states would need to replicate all (existing) aid contracts on a permissioned blockchain. Only 
states would initially be allowed to write consensus data on the blockchain; entrusted third 
parties such as multilateral organizations could be added. Their roles would be to control 
access rights to the permissioned blockchain and to validate that states have honored their 
obligations specified in smart contracts. For example, a smart contract may specify that a 
donor government transfers a specified amount to a recipient government if the latter 
improves its public financial management (PFM) system. To verify that PFM improvements 
actually occurred, states could invite the World Bank as an entrusted third party to validate 
PFM reform. Following a seal of approval written onto the blockchain, the smart contract 
would release donor funds automatically.  
As the PFM example illustrates, verification is critical. Smart contracts can evaluate some 
conditions without the need for third-party validation and prediction markets, especially 
digital assets. However, real-world events off the blockchain must be digitally represented at 
first. In particular, to judge whether or not policy reforms are implemented requires human 
judgment that third parties such as multilateral organizations, independent evaluators, and 
NGOs are positioned to fulfill. However, no such validator may exist when verification is 
prohibitively costly, or these intermediaries may not be trustworthy either, for instance 
because they want to extract rents from donors. To reduce reliability on third parties, 
                                                          
6 As of August 8, Disberse had implemented three pilots. The aim of the company is to offer international 
payment services at lower cost than existing banks, which in most cases implies fees of 1% on deposit and 
1% on retrieval.  
7 Reducing the level of decentralization can be an alternative mechanism to reduce transaction cost and to 
increase scalability. In the context of permissionless blockchains, developers have considered the 
introduction super-nodes and an increase in block size. 
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blockchain-based prediction markets such as Augur—a permissionless blockchain to foster 
consensus about specific events—may be useful. These prediction markets are tamper-proof 
because participants stake money on their predictions and no central authority can censor 
them. In the case of Augur, reporters receive half of the fees in the system multiplied by the 
token shares they own. Because participants of the prediction market have an incentive to not 
undermine the value of the token, they have incentives to truthfully report. For their part, 
reporters do not need to worry about payments, which are being guaranteed by smart 
contracts.8 In the context of aid delivery, blockchain-based prediction markets are particularly 
useful for verifying those recipient-country behaviors that relate to their interactions with 
citizens. For instance, citizens can report on the level of public goods they obtained from their 
government, or the level of respect for human rights. Recorded directly on the blockchain, 
these reports affect the disbursement of aid funds from the donor to the recipient government.  
Donor–recipient relations governed by smart contracts have advantages over current 
approaches, which involve a combination of different strategies to mitigate agency 
problems—policy conditionality, project aid, and bypass aid. Smart contracts drastically 
reduce—if not eliminate—possibilities for cheating. Neither donors nor recipients can shirk 
on their commitments as the code is executed when pre-defined conditions are met. But it is 
important to understand the limitations of smart contracts. First, guaranteed enforcement only 
applies to the blockchain. While the blockchain ensures execution of transfer of claims to 
property, it requires an intermediary to physically transfer property between parties 
(Arruñada, 2018). Hence, enforcement is guaranteed only for digital assets. Second, for smart 
contracts to have actual bite, governments must stake real resources upon their promises that 
would be lost if governments were to renege on their promises. The challenge then becomes 
how to get governments to make such stakes. In this regard, the blockchain may be helpful 
because it makes empty promises transparent, thereby increasing the effectiveness of peer 
pressure and naming-and-shaming by NGOs. Similarly, as every participant in the blockchain 
network has the same information at any point in time, broken promises are immediately 
visible to everyone, making attempts to manipulate this information unsuccessful. Third, 
smart contracts are most effective for governing complete contracts while having little benefit 
for incomplete contracts which require parties to renegotiate key aspects of their aid 
relationship as circumstances change. While incomplete contracts may be a deliberate design 
choice—allowing parties to adapt to changing circumstances in a flexible manner (Rosendorff 
and Milner, 2001)—complete contracts may be the preferred choice when participants have 
incentives to tie their hands, for example when a donor has a long-term ODA/GNI target that 
it wishes to maintain even when the fiscal situation deteriorates.9 The existing aid governance 
architecture would not allow governments to make commitments of comparable credibility—
not even through multilateral organizations which have only limited possibilities for 
enforcement, such as suspension of voting rights as last resort.  
                                                          
8 For a detailed description, see www.augur.net (accessed October 30, 2017). 
9 The UK provides a case in point. The government ring-fenced the ODA budget in the Global Financial 
Crisis but this policy has been attacked repeatedly, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-
view/10121578/Time-to-remove-the-foreign-aid-ring-fence.html (Accessed July 4, 2018).  
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Blockchain technology also has potential to address cooperation problems among donor 
governments related to the collective financing of development programs. Currently existing 
multilateral organizations were established with a role to police burden-sharing arrangements 
among donor countries, but the punishments they can mobilize often do not suffice to ensure 
donor compliance. A blockchain solution may address this problem. New financing targets 
could be defined following a so-called ‘multi-party escrow’ requiring n out of N countries to 
agree on a specific aid target. A multi-party escrow can also be used to ensure donors against 
under-compliance among their peer donors, specifying that aid dollars leave the national 
treasury only when n out of N other countries have paid their agreed share. These conditions 
can be coded easily as smart contracts. Again it is important to note a limitation. While the 
technology helps donor governments cooperate which prefer a high-contribution scenario but 
which are worried about cheating, it is ineffective in cases where donors prefer the low-
contribution equilibrium. Hopes are that to counter highly reluctant donor governments, non-
state actors with progressive development preferences could become literal ‘stakeholders’—
essentially providing for the missing stake—but even this would not be possible without the 
consent of the respective donor government.  
Coordination problems  
Even if all donors agree to support development, they often fail to coordinate on a portfolio of 
activities that operationalize their goal. Currently existing multilateral organizations strike a 
balance among donors with heterogeneous aid preferences (Annen and Knack, 2015). With 
well-functioning multilateral organizations, there is little potential for blockchain technology 
to further improve donor coordination.  
In recent years, donors have intensified their efforts to evaluate aid projects in recent years, 
reflecting their desire to reduce information asymmetries and to transfer aid to where it is 
demonstrably most effective. But evaluation is costly and often fraught with error as aid 
success is hard to quantify. Much evaluation effort also is duplicated, as relevant information 
is often not shared across organizations. Blockchain technology can enhance the evaluation 
functions of aid agencies and thus help increase the share of result-based aid in development 
budgets. In particular, the technology would provide an efficient way for agencies to share 
their evaluations securely and in a fully transparent way.  
Blockchain technology could also improve the accuracy of project evaluations. Under the 
current system, project managers self-evaluate their projects, complemented by re-evaluations 
from evaluation departments. A blockchain-based evaluation system would rely on prediction 
markets that allow for real input from ultimate beneficiaries. All stakeholders have incentives 
to participate in this market. Donors want to report back concrete results to their communities 
and should hence be willing to invest into reliable information (Buntaine, Parks and Buch, 
2017). Local beneficiaries have incentives to participate in this market and to report truthfully. 
As they have local information to predict project success, they can invest into shares 
reflecting the likelihood of project success and earn a profit when project success becomes 
publicly known. As holders of the natural token in the prediction market, they have incentives 
for truthful reporting. While recipient governments may have incentives to exaggerate project 
success—for example because their aid receipt depends on results—they would need to 
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compete against the aggregate verdict of the public prediction. The less successful a project 
really is, the costlier it is for the government to manipulate the prediction market outcome. 
Ideally, it would be prohibitively costly to do so. 
 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
Foreign aid is often considered to play an important role in promoting development—initially, 
by providing capital to boost investment in physical infrastructure, and subsequently, to help 
build institutions that “counteract the many perverse incentives likely to occur” in human 
interaction (Ostrom et al., 2002, p. 4). And yet, foreign aid is subject to collective action 
problems that limit its effectiveness. Consequently, donor aid agencies have explored the 
potential of blockchain technology to address some of these problems and to enhance the 
efficiency of aid delivery. But the use cases they examine—digital identity, aid supply chain 
management, and aid payments without financial intermediaries—remain within the confines 
of the existing aid governance architecture, with aid agencies occupying a central role as 
intermediaries (DANIDA, 2017; GSMA, 2017; IDRC, 2017; Wigley and Cary, 2017; GIZ, 
2018; KfW, 2018).10  
While reviewing such blockchain-based applications for aid delivery, this paper is the first to 
discuss potential applications in aid governance. This involves semi-trusted environments in 
which official donors and recipient governments negotiate foreign aid contracts, a group of 
donors seek to collectively finance development programs, or donor agencies enter into 
contractual relationships with local service providers. In all these cases, blockchain 
technology provides a platform to support smart contracts that make transactions practically 
unstoppable when pre-defined conditions are fulfilled (Diedrich, 2016). Using blockchain 
technology, donors would be less likely to renege on aid commitments, while recipients 
would be more likely to follow through with policy reforms. Blockchain technology may also 
remedy information problems, for example by facilitating prediction markets that can verify if 
certain events have occurred (Swan, 2015).  
The use of smart contracts for governing foreign aid relations is a most-likely case of adoption 
of blockchain technology because it generates tangible benefits for all stakeholders while 
preserving the role of existing organizations in the aid governance architecture. For donors, 
blockchain technology guarantees recipients enact policy reforms, thus providing leverage 
against aid critics at the domestic level. But blockchains also allow recipient governments to 
demonstrate commitment to reforms, while non-state actors would support the blockchain as 
it makes aid flows more transparent and hence governments more accountable. In other 
words, the above minimal scenario has low ‘transition costs’ and hence a good chance of 
adoption because it preserves the existing political arrangements (Khan, 1995).  
In a more radical scenario, states would establish a decentralized autonomous organization 
(DAO) for development, in which all stakeholders—donor governments, recipient 
                                                          
10 An important recent example is the announcement by the World Bank to issue a blockchain-operated 
new debt instrument on August 9, 2018 (https://t.co/tieQoQ9uLe).  
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governments, multilateral organizations, NGOs, and individuals—would participate and 
interact via smart contracts. This would imply the end of ODA, as the emergent ecosystem 
would be governed by a natural token underpinned by aid donations. Tokens can be used to 
pay anyone in the ecosystem for service delivery and event validation. Aid agencies and 
multilateral organization would be just one among many providers in this regard. To deal with 
the problem of incomplete contracts, DAO stakeholders would reformulate governance rules 
as deemed necessary, for instance by a (qualified) majority of votes.  
The potential benefit of a development DAO is that aid would become more demand-driven, 
in line with the Paris Declaration commitment. For example, recipient governments could 
formulate development plans (‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’) as smart contracts to 
which donors can pledge resources. Further, beneficiary communities could directly leverage 
smart contracts to propose potential projects at low cost and find like-minded partners to 
implement these projects, with the DAO providing the overarching institutional framework. 
The smart contract might specify that a certain quorum of donors must be found to ensure its 
financial viability, while the funds from supporting donors would be held in escrow and 
disbursed only when the required quorum is actually achieved. Overall, a development DAO 
would help repair the ‘broken feedback loop’ (Svensson, 2006) in aid governance.  
The drawback of a development DAO is that it is unlikely to come into existence without 
support from governments. In principle, peer-to-peer donations through a permissionless 
blockchain are possible but doing so imports the undesirable properties of such chains. In 
practice, the DAO must be based on a permissionless blockchain to be economically viable, 
which would require governments to police the platform (a task that they could delegate to 
multilateral organizations though). How likely is this to happen? On the one hand, aid 
agencies may obstruct a development DAO because it threatens to undermine their role as aid 
intermediaries. Individual donors could provide aid directly, without aid agency 
intermediaries, because identities, assets, and transactions are trusted once recorded on the 
blockchain. Rather than lobbying their donor governments, non-governmental donors—such 
as diasporas wishing to support their ethnic kin abroad (Anwar and Michaelowa, 2006)— can 
do so directly using smart contracts and blockchain-based identity services, similar to 
blockchain-based payment systems which already allow for efficient transfer of remittances 
(Wigley and Cary, 2017). On the other hand, aid agencies may support the DAO to the extent 
that the increased transparency of aid provision and the demand-driven allocation boost aid 
donations from non-government actors that also benefit these aid agencies as providers of 
technical expertise and entrusted validators.  
What are the implications for real-existing multilateral organizations? In the most-likely 
scenario, multilateral organizations may not be significantly affected but will change their 
character. In particular, their transactional functions may become redundant because 
blockchains can enact transactions (subject to agreed conditionality) more cheaply. But 
multilaterals will continue to play a role in monitoring behavior and verifying results, even 
though competitive pressure from prediction markets challenges their dominant position. 
Multilaterals will also expand their role in policy deliberation and technical assistance in the 
implementation of development policy. Under the less-likely scenario, however, the 
traditional model of multilateral aid provision would topple. If states were to implement the 
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far-reaching proposal of a development DAO, the traditional governance role of multilaterals 
would no longer be needed. However, they would be well-positioned actors to police the 
platform, to act as think-tanks and agenda-setters, validators of real-world events, and 
capacity builders.  
My preliminary analysis suggests that foreign aid is an issue area in which blockchain 
technology has undeniable benefits and is already being used to make aid delivery more 
effective. But blockchain technology is no panacea—its benefits outweigh its costs only under 
certain conditions. A number of issues remain for future research. First, as a relatively new 
innovation, blockchain technology must prove its full functionality, reliability, and 
sustainability in real-world applications before states will be ready to adopt it. For example, 
blockchain-based prediction markets are relatively new and their resilience to manipulation by 
actors with high stakes in prediction outcomes is yet unknown. In that regard, multilateral 
organizations would be an ideal regulator for these markets to ensure their proper functioning. 
Second, researchers may examine how the availability of blockchain technology will alter the 
relative attractiveness of different aid modalities. Theoretically, to the degree that smart 
contracts make cheating less attractive, donors may resuscitate aid modalities that were prone 
to moral hazard. In other words, project aid may become less important, to the benefit of 
program aid. In addition, blockchain-based prediction markets will boost results-based aid 
because they enlarge the set of outcomes that are digitally verifiable. Third, these possible 
changes will have repercussions for aid effectiveness. Once blockchain-based aid governance 
has come to fruition, researchers should assess the extent to which the technology has made 
aid more effective compared to a business-as-usual case.  
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